Is Decentralisation Compatible with the Application of Performance Management? The Impacts of Minimum Service Standards on the Motivation of Local Government to Improve Service Delivery in the Indonesian Decentralised System by Roudo, Mohammad et al.
Journal of Regional and City Planning 
vol. 29, no. 2, page. 135-155, August 2018 
DOI: 10.5614/jrcp.2018.29.2.5 
 
 
ISSN 2502-6429 online © 2018 ITB Journal Publisher 
 
Is Decentralisation Compatible with the 
Application of Performance Management? The 
Impacts of Minimum Service Standards on the 
Motivation of Local Government to Improve 
Service Delivery in the Indonesian 
Decentralised System  
 
Mohammad Roudo, Adrian Campbell and Simon Delay1 
 
[Received: January 16, 2018; accepted in final version: April 26, 2018] 
 
Abstract. The extent to which decentralisation is compatible with effective performance 
management that is able to influence the motivation of public sector bodies has been a subject of 
limited attention in the academic literature. This paper contributes to that limited debate by 
investigating the extent to which minimum service standards (MSS), a performance management 
tool directed at local government service delivery, influences the motivation of local governments 
in highly decentralised systems, such as that in Indonesia. The two research questions are: (a) 
what influence does MSS have on the motivation of local governments to improve their service 
delivery performance, and (b) to what extent does decentralisation influence the implementation 
of performance management. The information used to answer these questions is taken from semi-
structured interviews with eighty-three respondents from central government, district and city 
governments, and the non-governmental sector. The results of this study show that MSS, with its 
characteristic minimum thresholds, can lead to different patterns of motivation in local 
governments to improve service delivery. However, MSS only motivates better performance 
amongst those local governments whose current performance falls just below the required 
standard. It does not appear to motivate those who are well above or well below the standards. 
This study also showed the limitations of centrally led performance management systems like MSS 
to improve performance. They are constrained by the decentralised nature of the system, wherein 
the autonomy of local governments has to be respected. This implies that decentralisation is, to 
some extent, not compatible with effective performance management and attempts to improve 
local service delivery, which requires strong enforcement and effective incentives. However, this 
does not mean that MSS has no impact at all. Although the impact is limited, MSS, to an extent, 
helps to improve central-local dialogue in service delivery. This could be a good starting point 
for the improvement of public services in districts and cities in the future. 
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Abstrak. Sejauh mana desentralisasi kompatibel dengan manajemen kinerja yang efektif dapat 
mempengaruhi motivasi badan-badan sektor publik telah menjadi subyek perhatian yang terbatas 
dalam literatur akademik. Makalah ini berkontribusi pada perdebatan terbatas tersebut dengan 
menyelidiki sejauh mana standar pelayanan minimum (SPM), suatu alat manajemen kinerja yang 
diarahkan pada penyampaian layanan pemerintah daerah, mempengaruhi motivasi pemerintah 
daerah dalam sistem yang sangat terdesentralisasi, seperti di Indonesia. Dua pertanyaan 
penelitian mencakup: (a) pengaruh apa yang dimiliki SPM terhadap motivasi pemerintah daerah 
untuk meningkatkan kinerja penyampaian layanan mereka, dan (b) sejauh mana desentralisasi 
mempengaruhi pelaksanaan manajemen kinerja. Informasi yang digunakan untuk menjawab 
pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini diambil dari wawancara semi-terstruktur dengan delapan puluh tiga 
responden dari pemerintah pusat, kabupaten dan kota, dan sektor non-pemerintah. Hasil 
penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa SPM, dengan batas minimum karakteristiknya, dapat 
menyebabkan pola motivasi yang berbeda di pemerintah daerah untuk meningkatkan penyediaan 
layanan. Namun, SPM hanya memotivasi kinerja yang lebih baik di antara pemerintah daerah 
yang kinerjanya saat ini berada di bawah standar yang dipersyaratkan. Tampaknya SPM tidak 
memotivasi mereka yang jauh di atas atau jauh di bawah standar. Penelitian ini juga 
menunjukkan keterbatasan sistem manajemen kinerja terpusat seperti SPM untuk meningkatkan 
kinerja. Mereka dibatasi oleh sifat sistem yang terdesentralisasi, di mana otonomi pemerintah 
lokal harus dihormati. Ini menunjukkan bahwa desentralisasi, sampai taraf tertentu, tidak 
kompatibel dengan manajemen kinerja yang efektif dan upaya untuk meningkatkan penyampaian 
layanan lokal yang membutuhkan penegakan hukum yang kuat dan insentif yang efektif. Namun, 
ini tidak berarti bahwa SPM tidak berdampak sama sekali. Meskipun dampaknya terbatas, SPM, 
sampai taraf tertentu, membantu meningkatkan dialog pusat-lokal dalam pemberian layanan. Ini 
bisa menjadi titik awal yang baik untuk peningkatan pelayanan publik di kabupaten dan kota di 
masa depan. 
Kata kunci. Standar pelayanan minimum (SPM), desentralisasi, manajemen kinerja, layanan 
publik, pemerintah daerah. 
Introduction 
 
The emergence of New Public Management (NPM) raises the importance of performance in the 
public sector. The orientation of public managers, both at central and local level, both in 
developed and less developed countries, goes beyond thinking about inputs and processes and 
instead shifts towards a focus on outputs, outcomes and even impacts (Hood, 1991; Polidano and 
Hulme, 1999). As a result, instruments to measure and manage performance become more crucial. 
Following this logic, there also needs to be a way of measuring and managing the performance of 
local governments, which are part of the public sector, since some powers and authorities have 
been decentralised (devolved) from the central government to local governments.  
 
The question arises how effective the implementation of performance management is when most 
powers are decentralised. In other words, to what extent is decentralisation compatible with 
effective performance management in influencing the behaviour of the public sector. Particularly 
motivation (compliance) is an essential question that has been subject to limited attention within 
the academic literature.  
 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating the extent to which minimum service standards 
(MSS), a performance management tool directed at local government service delivery, influences 
the motivation of local government to improve their performance in highly decentralised systems, 
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such as those in Indonesia. The two research questions of this study were: (a) what influence does 
MSS have on the motivation of local governments to improve their service delivery performance, 
and (b) to what extent does decentralisation influence the implementation of effective 
performance management toward the motivation of local government.  
 
This paper consists of three parts. The first part is a review of the literature on the concept of 
decentralisation and its potential merits and costs. The discussion also includes a literature review 
towards the concept of MSS and its relationship with the practice of decentralisation in Indonesia 
towards the improvement of public servies. Secondly, it reviews the way performance 
management influences behaviour in the public sector. The second part is about the design and 
methodology of this research. The last part presents the data, analysis and a discussion of the 
various patterns of motivation in the public sector in response to MSS. The principal–agent 
approach as well as the phenomenon of the unambitious average syndrome are used. In this part, 
the influence of decentralisation on effective performance management, particularly towards the 
possibility to set strong enforcement and appropriate incentives, is also analysed. Besides that, 
the reasons for continuing performance management beyond pursueing effective performance 
management are also analysed.  
 
Literature Review  
 
Concept, Gains and Costs of Decentralisation 
 
The term decentralisation is defined differently by different scholars depending on the area, 
subject and context in which the term is deployed. Smith (1985) notes that there is no single 
definition that can exactly represent the entire concept, given that it can be applied in a wide range 
of areas and can refer to various definitions. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), for instance, argue that 
decentralised management in the public sector refers to situations in which managers are given 
flexibility to tackle their responsibilities and gain bigger managerial autonomy and authority to 
achieve their organization’s goals. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, pp. 101-106) distinguish six 
categories of decentralisation commonly applied to most public organisations and countries: 
political, administrative, competitive, non-competitive, internal, and external. Others, such as the 
World Bank (2003), Firman (2003), and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), have also expanded 
the concept proposed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) by adding two types of decentralisation, 
financial and spatial-economic decentralisation.  
 
There is a long-standing debate among scholars on the merits and costs of decentralisation. The 
supporters of decentralised systems believe this approach to be the best way to govern modern 
societies and the best solution to the failures of centralised systems. Scholars such as Conyers 
(1983) and international organisations such as UCLG (2009) believe that decentralisation creates: 
a more responsive and reactive government when it comes to service provision (in the 
administrative spectrum); more accountability, more transparency, and more participation in 
decision-making (in the political spectrum); and more equal revenue sharing between centre and 
periphery (in the fiscal spectrum).  
 
The supporters of decentralised systems argue that those strengths are achieved because of the 
ability of such systems to bring government closer to the people as well as give more discretion 
to both local governments and local people (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Boasiako and 
Csanyi, 2014). Moreover, decentralisation also shortens the route of accountability so services 
are delivered quicker and cheaper. Instead of following ‘a long route’, where accountability of 
providers of services to local people should be held by national policy makers, ‘a short route’ is 
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followed, where accountability is only held by local governments (World Bank, 2003; Ahmad et 
al., 2006). Besides that, a decentralised system requires accountability of performance of the 
heads of autonomous regions to their people through a form of political competition. Faguet 
(2011), based on experiences in Europe, Asia and Africa, uses the same logic by arguing that 
decentralisation policy will punish poor performing governments at elections.  
 
However, this does not mean that decentralisation has no potential costs. It brings risks related to 
inequality of resources and capacities. Decentralisation policy gives more autonomy and 
discretion to local governments, including how to deliver services, in considering their own 
financial and human resources and capacities (Aritenang, 2015). Thus, regions that are rich in 
natural resources have high levels of discretion to deliver better services based on the interests of 
their local people. In contrast, poor regions have many limitations in terms of fiscal and financial 
capacity. That is why inequality of quality of services between regions often cannot be avoided 
in decentralised systems.  
 
Moreover, the central government may not treat every region equally. Unlike in centralised 
systems, when there is persistence to maintain uniformity of quality of services across regions, 
decentralisation policy allows non-uniformity in services to match the interests of local people 
and the local government’s financial capacity (Breton, 2002). Homme (1995) refers to this as an 
additional danger of decentralisation. Similarly, Fuhr (2011) refers to this phenomenon as an 
inequality trap, while Vazquez and Vaillancourt, (2011) note it as an obstacle of decentralisation. 
  
Moreover, decentralisation also has negative consequences by creating inefficiency in the 
coordination between the central government and local governments since the central government 
has less authority to control the local governments. Homme (1995), Fuhr (2011) and Vazquez and 
Vaillancourt, (2011) note it as coordination problems, traps or obstacles of decentralised systems 
when the central government is unable to directly intervene and control the performance of local 
governments.  
 
Indonesian Decentralisation, Public Service and MSS 
 
The emerging concept of minimum service standards cannot be separated from the rationale of 
Indonesian decentralisation towards public services. As is known, in 1999 Indonesia started with 
a ‘big-bang’ decentralisation process that rapidly and significantly devolved most central 
government powers and authorities to local governments (see Aspinall and Feally, 2003; Alm, 
Vazquez and Weist, 2004). This policy, seen as a panacea to the multi-dimensional crisis in 
Indonesia that reached its peak in 1998, has been a major instrument of political, economic and 
social reform (Hofman and Kaiser, 2006; Fengler and Hofman, 2009).  
 
While some of these rationales, such as preventing conflicts between regions and reducing unfair 
fiscal allocation between the central government and local governments, are relatively 
straightforward to accomplish, improving the quality of public services and capacity of 
government to deliver them is a significant challenge. According to Lewis and Pattinasarany 
(2009), basic public services neither significantly affect low-income people, nor have they 
significantly improved after the decentralisation. Kristiansen and Santoso (2006) add that the 
decentralisation policy in the Indonesian healthcare sector neither increased local government 
spending on local public health facilities for the poor, nor improved the accountability in the 
management of local health units. Similarly, decentralisation policy in the education sector in 
Indonesia neither improved transparency, accountability and financial allocation to primary and 
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secondary education, nor the inequality of these services across regions (Kristiansen and Pratikno, 
2006). 
 
Kompas (2015), one the largest newspapers in Indonesia, notes that national educational services 
are far from the required standards after decentralisation, whether in terms of competency, quality 
of teachers, or infrastructure. Similarly, a research conducted in 2016 by Muttaqin et al. (2016) 
found that educational attainment in Indonesia as shown by length of schooling only slightly 
increased after the introduction of decentralisation policy. Strategic Asia (2013) refers to this as 
an ‘unfinished agenda’ after almost a decade of ongoing decentralisation.  
 
Table 1. Indicators and MSS standards in the health sector. 
 
No 
Types of 
services 
Indicators Standards 
Targeted 
year 
1 Basic 
treatment 
Daily visit to pregnant mothers (K4 criteria) 95% 2015 
  Visits to pregnant mothers in case of 
complicated problems 
80% 2015 
  Aid from health workers or nurses 90% 2015 
  Service to mothers after giving birth (childbed) 90 % 2015 
  Neo-natal care in case of complicated problems 80% 2010 
  Baby visits 90% 2010 
  Universal child immunization in Sub Districts 100 % 2010 
  Services to under 5-year old children 90 % 2010 
  Provision of food additional to breast-milk to 
children from poor families from 6 months to 2 
years 
100% 2010 
  Services to those under 5 years old who are 
malnourished so that they get special treatment 
100% 2010 
  Quality of health of students in primary schools 100% 2010 
  Active family planning participation 70% 2010 
  Observation and treatment for those who are ill  100% 2010 
  Basic health services for poor families 100% 2015 
2 Referral 
treatment 
Recommended services for poor families 100% 2015 
  First level of emergency services that should be 
supported by health infrastructure in districts 
 
100% 2015 
3 Epidemiology 
investigation 
and cure for 
special 
diseases 
Scope of village or subdistricts launching 
special epidemiology investigations in fewer 
than 24 hours 
 
100% 2015 
4 Health 
promotion and 
people 
empowerment 
Scope of Active Alert Villages 80% 2015 
Source: Ministry of Health (MoHE) Decree 828/Menkes/SK/IX/2008 
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Table 2. Indicators and MSS standards in the education sector. 
 
No Types of services 
Indicators for primary 
schools 
Indicators for junior high schools 
1 Affordable walking 
distance from 
remote/isolate areas 
6 kms 3 kms 
2 Number of students per 
class 
32 (complete with chair, 
table, blackboard) 
36 (complete with chair, table, 
blackboard) 
3 Teacher rooms per school 1 1 
4 Principal room per school - 1 (separated from teacher’s room) 
5 Physics laboratory - Capacity for 36 students with 
demonstration instrument 
6 Availability of teacher 6 teachers for each unit of 
education and 4 teachers 
for each unit of education 
in a special region 
1 teacher for each subject or 1 
teacher for one group of subject in a 
special regions 
7 Teacher’s qualifications 2 undergraduate degree 
holders, 2 certified teachers 
70% of teacher has an 
undergraduate degree and half are 
certified (i.e. 40% undergraduate, 
20 % certified in special regions) 
8 Principal’s qualifications Undergraduate qualification 
and certification 
Undergraduate qualification and 
certification 
9 School supervisor’s 
qualifications 
Undergraduate qualification 
and certification 
Undergraduate qualification and 
certification 
10 Textbooks 1 set per student in 
Indonesian language, 
mathematics and sciences 
1 set per student 
Source: Ministry of National Education Decree (MNED) 23/2013 as a revision of MED 15/2010 
on the MSS of basic education. 
 
As a response to problems of low-quality public services and inequality of access to those services 
across regions (especially with respect to health and primary education), in 2002 through Decree 
No. 100/756/OTDA/2002, Indonesia’s central government introduced MSS. It was regulated in 
the 2004 Law 32, later revised in Law 23 of 2017 and Government Regulation (GR) 65/2005, and 
again revised in GR 2/2018. These documents contain guidance on the types and quality of basic 
services that are the main obligation of local governments and which should be received by the 
public at a minimum level (Ferrazzi, 2005; Hudawi, 2012). In other words, MSS is unique in 
defining minimum thresholds and is also considered a breakthrough, given the aim of both 
enhancing the quality of services and addressing the underlying problems with capacity that lie 
behind the inequality in access to services across regions (Roudo and Chalil, 2016).  
 
There are 15 MSS, which encapsulate 65 services and 174 indicators. Among the many sectors 
of MSS, two sectors, health and education, are at the heart of its implementation and reflect the 
most essential basic services. Besides that, MSS within these sectors entails considerable 
preparation in order to meet the terms laid out in the supporting law, regulations and ministerial 
decrees.  
 
MSS in the health sector has been in place since 2003, accompanied by the publication of Ministry 
of Health (MoHE) Decree No. 1457/2003, which was revised in 2008 through MoHE Decree 
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741/Menkes/Per/VII/2008 and MoHE Decree 828/Menkes/SK/IX/2008, which contain guidance 
on the implementation of MSS in the health sector in districts and cities. MSS within the education 
sector is similarly well-developed. It is regulated by MoNE Decree 23/2013 and its revised 
sibling, MoNE Decree 15/2010 on the MSS for basic education. This MoNE Decree provides 
operational guidance on the implementation of MSS in education. Some indicators and standards 
concerning MSS in the health and education sector based on these regulations can be seen in 
Table 1 and 2.  
 
Performance Management and Influence of Behaviour on Public Services 
 
As discussed above, the definitions of MSS are concerned with the obligations of local 
government. Also, the existence of MSS requires measurement and management of the 
performance of local governments related to powers that have been devolved in a decentralised 
system. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that MSS is tightly related to the performance 
management of local governments, particularly in delivering services. Given that MSS is a form 
of performance management, the literature on performance management and its potential 
influence towards the behaviour of local governments to improve the delivery of services was 
also reviewed, from the perspective of accountability and the principal–agent framework.  
 
The concept of accountability is contestable and multi-faceted. Sinclair (1995) points out that 
although the idea of accountability is complex, there is even no consensus about how to 
implement it in reality. Hughes (2003) and Lane (2003) argue that accountability refers to the 
responsibility of individuals or groups to report back about their performance to those who have 
give them a mandate. However, Parker and Gould (1999) argue that the idea of accountability in 
its operation and scope is more total and insistent than simply a responsibility since it requires the 
holding and providing of accounts involving two individuals or groups: those who have given a 
mandate and those who have received the mandate. From the definitions, the core elements of 
accountability can be seen concerning who are accountable, to whom, for what, and how. These 
elements reflect the relations between a principal and an agent.  
 
The model of principal–agent relations is actually an accountability model that seeks to explain 
how two actors, a principal and an agent, interact to achieve their own respective goals. Braun 
and Guston (2003) refer to it in terms of delegation and exchange of resources. They also term it 
the ‘opportunistic actor model’ since it is assumed that all actors are selfish, thinking only of 
themselves and promoting their own self-interests and personal welfare (Braun and Guston, 
2003). Similarly, Coleman (1990) highlighted it as ‘the extension of self-interests’ of actors to 
achieve their goals by delegating tasks to those with greater capacities than themselves. 
 
To ensure that agents remain accountable to the principal, there needs to be a mechanism to which 
both the principal and agents are bound. Waterman and Meier (1998) noted that there should be 
a ‘contract’ between the principal and the agent that establishes what the agent should do and 
what information should be received by the principal. This ‘contract’ acts to bind both the 
principal and the agent in order to improve the principal’s information, reducing the information 
gap between the principal and the agent and ensuring that the agent acts in the best interest of the 
principal (Hughes, 2003). 
 
In our context, this contract is converted to performance management. Van Dooren, Bouckaert, 
and Halligan (2010) and Moorhead and Griffin (2012) add that the importance of performance 
management can be seen from the extent to which it can positively change the behaviour of those 
individuals and organisations that it is intended to influence. In other words, as a contract, 
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performance management has no use unless it positively influences the individuals/organisations 
involved to improve their performance. Two kinds of agential behaviour are expected to emerge 
on the basis of performance management: compliance and motivation. This is simply illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 
This could be understood by framing the internal and external roles and functions of performance 
management. Scholars note that the importance of performance management to public managers 
is varied and will follow the purposes of the public managers who use it (Behn, 2003). Behn 
(2003) lists eight different purposes for performance management in the public sector: evaluate, 
control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn and improve.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Performance-management and influence on behaviour of individuals/organisations. 
Source: Adapted and modified from Behn (2003), De Bruijn (2007), Van Dooren, Bouckaert, 
and Halligan (2010). 
 
These eight roles can be generalised into two main functions: internal, to improve performance 
and productivity, as well as external, to hold agents accountable (see De Bruijn, 2007; Van 
Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan, 2010). The way performance management makes agents more 
motivated is related to the purposes of performance management to improve performance and 
productivity. This is related to internal roles and can be achieved through attempts to motivate, 
celebrate, promote and improve outcomes. Otherwise, the way performance management makes 
agents more compliant is related to the external purposes of performance management. 
Performance management is the way the principal holds the agent accountable by controling and 
evaluating the agent.  
 
Furthermore, the link between motivation and performance is explained by Mullins (2008) and 
Moorhead and Griffin (2012). They argue that the overall performance of an organisation is a 
function of its capacity, ability and motivation, and the external factors that either support or 
impede them (Mullins, 2008; Moorhead and Griffin, 2012). Simplified, it can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
Performance = Function [Ability + Motivation + Environment (External Factor)] 
 
From this formula, high motivation is considered to be the main determinant of individual and 
organisational performance. Understanding what motivates someone makes it possible to change 
 
 
 
 
Principal 
Agent 
To Motivate 
To Evaluate, Control 
More 
motivated 
More 
compliance 
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their attitude and influence their behaviour towards what is desired (Huczynski and Buchanan, 
1991). In the principal–agent framework, to motivate means that the principal should be able to 
direct agents to act, work and behave according to what is required and expected by the principal, 
without resorting to force (Crowther and Green, 2004). When agents are motivated, the principals 
will be able to direct agents to work according to their interests and expectations. This means that 
they can direct their agents to produce maximum output and improve their performance to achieve 
organisational goals (Crowther and Green, 2004). Here, a principal uses performance 
management to make agents more motivated, more accountable and more willing to do a good 
job in pursuit of the principal’s interests and the goals of the organisation (Braun and Guston, 
2003). As argued by Lane (2005), when performance management is effectively treated as a tool 
to motivate, the principal will be able to motivate in an efficient manner given particular 
constraints. As motivation increases, the agent’s performance will improve.  
 
Furthermore, Milward and Provan (2000) and Braun and Guston (2003) stress the importance of 
a ‘clear’ principal and agent relation, where the relations between principal and agent in using 
performance measurement should be attributed by a set of proper enforcements and incentives. 
This will ensure that the results from measuring and managing performance will influence the 
public organisation’s overall management and change the behaviour of public organisations 
(Milward and Provan, 2000; Braun and Guston, 2003). In other words, incentives and 
enforcements are required as two core elements of performance management that are able to 
influence of behaviour of public organisations. While motivation requires a number of incentives, 
compliance requires particular enforcements. Simply put, incentives can be defined as external or 
internal factors that motivate people to act (Laffont and Martimort, 2009). Two common types of 
incentives can be identified: financial and non-financial incentives. Moreover, enforcements 
include routine monitoring, evaluation and auditing as well as consistent sanctions or 
punishments.  
 
Aside from positive results of performance management, such as greater motivation and 
compliance, there are also a number of potentially dysfunctional effects. One type of negative 
effects is the unambitious average syndrome. The phrase ‘unambitious average’ was commonly 
used by auditors in the UK during the 1990s and 2000s in the context of performance management 
of local governments under top-down regimes, particular directed at league tables. They would 
use the term to describe units in the public sector that had no motivation to improve their 
performance beyond their targets, despite them having the ability to do so. These units preferred 
to remain in the middle, neither exceeding nor falling below their targets, and would stay safely 
in that position to avoid inspection or supervision from auditors, inspectors or higher authorities. 
There was no point in performing at a higher level and thus they maintained an average 
performance just slightly above or in line with the target that had been set.  
 
According to Inside House (2016), in the case of UK housing organisations, the unambitious 
average syndrome refers to a mediocre average since there is nothing to push units above the 
target and they tend to remain close to mediocrity (cited in Inside Housing, Out of Commission, 
2016): 
 
What Ms Taylor calls the ‘unambitious average’ that is the concern. ‘There will be nothing 
to push them anymore,’ she says. ‘It will be easier to get away with mediocrity now,’ 
agrees... (Inside Housing, 2016) 
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Design and Methods 
 
The design used for this research was a multiple and parallel case study, where several cases are 
observed together. A qualitative approach was deployed. The data were taken from extensive 
semi-structured interviews with 83 individuals in total, including central government officers 
from 9 Indonesian technical ministries; local government actors (i.e. regional heads, members of 
local councils as well as local agencies and local providers); non-government actors, including 
university scholars as well as experts and representatives from non-government organisations 
(NGOs). Information from quantitative secondary data, focusing on the achievement of MSS 
targets in 8 districts and cities, was also used for completeness.  
 
Nonprobability sampling, specifically purposive sampling, was used to select the 8 districts and 
cities. The choice was based on two considerations: level of performance of districts or cities 
based on the Evaluation of Performance of Regional/Local Governance, or Evaluasi Kinerja 
Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah (EKPPD), published by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MoHA); and the fiscal capacity of each district or city, published by the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF). The characteristics of the area were also considered: Java (more developed) and outside 
of Java (less developed), as presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Selection of cases using purposive sampling. 
 
 Java Outside of Java 
 Cities Regencies Cities Regencies 
High 
performance 
City of Depok 
(Province of West 
Java) 
District of Sleman 
(Province of 
Jogjakarta) 
City of Denpasar 
(Province of Bali) 
District of Batang 
Hari (Province of 
Jambi) 
Low 
performance 
City of Bekasi 
(Province of West 
Java) 
District of West 
Bandung 
(Province of West 
Java) 
City of Padang 
Sidempuan (Province 
of North Sumatera) 
District of 
Southwest Sumba 
(Province of East 
Nusa Tenggara) 
 
To select the 83 interviewees, purposive and snowball sampling were used. Thematic analysis 
was used to analyse the collected data. Although MSS consists of 15 sectors, this research only 
focused on the health and primary education sectors, as discussed above. In this research, 
achievement of MSS standards in the health sector based on the performance of the district or city 
was used instead of education, which is based on school performance.  
 
Analysis and Discussion  
 
MSS and Varying Effects on the Motivation of Local Government to Improve Service 
Delivery 
 
The analysis of the influence of MSS on the motivation of local governments to improve their 
service delivery performance was done firstly through observing the position of each local 
government (district or city) vis-à-vis the MSS standards. This position was then related to the 
results from the interviews in order to identify similarities and differences in the motivations of 
local governments.  
 
In order to understand the position of each local government we observed the performance of 
MSS in the health sector in 2015. This was calculated from data on the achievement of MSS 
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standards published by MoHE. These standards are set as an average of the percentage of 
standards across indicators. Figure 2 below shows the performance in the health sector for each 
sample district and city in 2015.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. MSS achievement in six health indicators for cities and districts in 2015. 
 
While target standards are set at 87.5%, the performance of the 8 districts and cities can be 
classified into three categories. The first category consists of local governments whose current 
achievement exceeds the MSS target standards. In this category are Sleman, with a current 
achievement of 97.5%, and Denpasar, with 92.02%. The second category includes local 
governments whose current progress falls just below the targets. These include Bekasi, with a rate 
of 82.41%, Depok (81.31%) and Batanghari (76.45%). Finally, the third category comprises local 
governments whose current level of performance is well below the standard. In this category are 
West Bandung, Padang Sidempuan and Southwest Sumba, whose current levels of achievement 
are 63.2%, 45.56 % and 39.6% respectively.  
 
Combined with the information obtained from the interviews through thematic analysis, we can 
say that MSS seems to motivate improvements in performance among the local governments in 
the second category, whose current performance falls just below the standards. Some local 
governments, such as Depok, Bekasi and Batanghari, are motivated to exceed the standards, 
although they do not perceive there to be any incentives for them to do so or enforcements if they 
fail to. These three local governments are motivated to maintain their performance at a level 
slightly above the standards – or at least close to it – in order to avoid scrutiny from higher 
authorities during coordination meetings. They will seek to maintain this position since they feel 
safe in the middle and, effectively, avoid scrutiny from auditors in provincial and central 
governments.  
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As such, the empirical findings reveal that MSS is important to these local governments, as 
evidenced in the following extract from the interviews conducted with local government officials 
in Bekasi:  
 
It seems that our concern about being embarrassed by our mayor in front of other local 
technical agencies has become our motivation to achieve the MSS’s standards although we 
believe there will be no enforcement from him. Some of the indicators in MSS have been 
achieved by us and only a few have yet to be accomplished. Our current position is near 
the standards so it would be embarrassing for our mayor if we could still not close this 
small gap. We keep our spirit to achieve the standards in a short time. If we could pass or 
exceed the standards, it would be terrific. (Local Health Agency, City of Bekasi, 2016) 
 
In this city, it seems this could be because local government members worry about being 
embarrassed in front of their principals (mayors, regional heads, higher authorities, and so on). 
Local bureaucrats at the district level can feel embarrassed that their current performance is below 
the standards that have been set, even though they will receive no rewards if they succeed nor 
punishments if they fail. Thus they improve their performance to avoid behind ashamed in front 
of regional heads (as their principals) and amongst other local technical agencies.  
 
However, MSS does not seem to motivate those whose performance is either above the standards 
or well below the standards, that is, those districts/cities in the first or third categories. Firstly, 
those local governments who are in the first category, Sleman and Denpasar, are not motivated to 
continually improve their performance once they have passed the standards. MSS seems less 
important to them since they have already achieved the required standards and there is no further 
incentive for them to continue to improve their performance. Thus, they maintain an average level 
of performance despite being able to achieve more, thereby avoiding a situation in which an 
extraordinary performance attracts the attention of higher authorities. Instead of improving their 
achievement against MSS standards, they pay attention to other measurements that better reflect 
quality assurance, such as accreditation. This is evident in the following extract from an interview 
with members of local government from Sleman:  
 
In most sectors in this district, the achievement of indicators has been above the MSS’s 
standards. In the education sector, for instance, the ratio of teachers to students and the 
fulfilment of numbers for primary and junior high schools in residential areas are higher 
than those required by the central government. There is no point in them continually 
improving their performance since they have already far exceeded the standards. To go 
higher would mean attracting attention from the central government to demand 
achievement. Thus, their focus is currently again not about MSS but is on the achievement 
of the Human Development Index (HDI), school accreditation and innovations in 
education. (Organisation Bureau, Regional Secretary, District of Sleman, 2015) 
 
Secondly, those local governments whose current performance falls far below the standards, i.e. 
those in the third category, such as Southwest Sumba and Padang Sidempuan, are not motivated 
to improve their performance in delivering services. This is reflected by their lower motivation to 
achieve the MSS standards. They may in some cases be willing to improve their performance to 
just above the standards, but they claim that they have no capacity to do this. The gap between 
the capacity required to pass the standards and their current capacity to do so is too large. In other 
words, for this category of local government, MSS seems less important. This is supported by 
statements from a government officer in Padang Sidempuan:  
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Perhaps MSS is very useful for us. It gives a clear clue as to what local governments have 
to do to deliver better services to people. While people are happy about the services, we are 
motivated to improve our performance more and more. However, the classic problem 
appears. Although we have a particular motivation, we cannot implement it since we do 
not have any funds. Our local budget capacity is very low and never sufficient. As a result, 
we and some local technical agencies are no longer motivated. (Organisation Bureau, 
Regional Secretary, City of Padang, Sidempuan, 2016) 
 
So far, we have identified the influence of MSS on the motivation of local governments to 
improve their performance in delivering services. The next task is to examine whether the 
influence of MSS that we have seen fits with or could at least be explained by the unambitious 
average syndrome. However, the unambitious average syndrome hypothesis built into this 
research differs from the practice in the UK, because it was modified to reflect MSS, in which a 
particular set of minimum standards must be met. This is outlined in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. Hypotheses on unambitious average syndrome from UK practice in league table 
system. 
 
Status of Current 
Performance of Public Units 
UK Practice on 
Unambitious Average 
(League Table) 
Adapted Hypothesis 
(Minimum Standards) 
Far above average/minimum 
standards 
Not important Less important 
Slightly above 
average/minimum standards 
Not important Less important 
Slightly below 
average/minimum standards 
Less important Important 
Far below average/minimum 
standards 
Important Important 
 
Based on what was found in Sleman and Denpasar, whose current achievement is above the 
standards (local governments in the first category), the influence of MSS on motivation in those 
in local governments fits the adapted hypothesis on the unambitious average syndrome. MSS as 
a performance management tool is neither sufficiently important to motivate local governments 
nor relevant once they have reached the required standards. 
 
Empirically, however, there is a further explanation in the case of MSS beyond the adapted 
hypothesis: local governments have no motivation to reach a higher level since they shift from 
minimum standards to other types of quality assurance, such as innovation and accreditation, 
which are more useful and beneficial. However, some explanations in relation to the unambitious 
average syndrome, such as avoiding the attention of auditors and higher authorities as well as 
having no incentive, were also found.  
 
Moreover, for local governments in the second category, that is those whose current achievement 
falls either just below or close to the standards, performance management is empirically shown 
to be important. The behaviour of local governments in this category is a good fit with the notion 
of the unambitious average syndrome. It can be seen that MSS is important to the local 
governments in this category.  
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Finally, for the local governments in the third category, whose current achievement falls well 
below the standards, the empirical findings reveal a different conclusion in relation to the concept 
of the unambitious average syndrome as it is set out the hypothesis. While the hypothesis notes 
that standards are important in the public sector, it was found empirically that MSS, as a set of 
standards, is not important for the motivation of local governments to improve service delivery 
performance. A comparison of the unambitious average syndrome hypothesis and the empirical 
evidence in the case of MSS can be seen in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5. Comparison between hypotheses and empirical findings. 
  
Status of Achievement 
of MSS 
Adapted Hypothesis 
Empirical Findings of MSS 
Practice 
Far and slightly above 
standards (1st category) 
Less important Less important (i.e. Sleman and 
Denpasar) 
Slightly below 
standards (2nd category) 
Important Important (i.e. Depok, Bekasi and 
Batang Hari) 
Far below standards  
(3rd category) 
Important Less important (i.e. Padang 
Sidempuan, West Bandung, 
Southwest Sumba) 
 
Incompatibility of Decentralisation to Application of Performance Management: 
Limitations to Strong Enforcements and Effective Incentives 
 
Based on the results of the interiews as discussed above we know that motivation of local 
governments to improve their service delivery is various in response to the existence of minimum 
standards or thresholds. However, the findings also show limited influence of MSS on 
performance of local governments since five out of the eight local governments were not 
motivated to improve their performance in their delivering services. The next question is to what 
extent the highly decentralised system affects the effectiveness of MSS in influencing the 
motivation of local governments.  
 
As discussed in the literature review section, two main elements, strong enforcement and effective 
incentives, are necessary to ensure the application of performance management. Thus, the extent 
to which decentralised systems can provide these two core elements, particularly in the 
implementation of MSS, is analysed.  
 
From the interviews it can be seen that information derived in the course of MSS is used and 
managed with sub-optimal and ineffective incentives and is undermined by a lack of strong 
enforcement. MSS is not supported by punishments or sanctions (what we might call ‘strong’ 
enforcement techniques). One local government officer says:  
 
In the current law and regulation concerning MSS, there is no chapter that regulates 
enforcement and punishment. Perhaps this means that districts and cities in this province 
do not try to achieve MSS standards. (Organisation Bureau, Regional Secretary, Province 
of West Java, 2015)  
 
A lack of authority of central government as caused by the decentralised system is one of the 
reasons why there is little enforcement and punishment in the implementation of MSS. A lack of 
authority was discussed by one central government officer in LAN, who said that:  
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In this decentralised system there is no direct vertical link between technical ministries and 
local technical agencies. Central government has no authority to force local government to 
implement MSS. That is why strong enforcement in terms of punishment is relatively 
difficult to apply. (State Administration Agency, LAN, 2015) 
 
If incentives, particularly financial or material incentives (in the form of block grants), have been 
planned and promised to encourage the implementation of MSS in some local governments, they 
are not addressed and allocated to those local public units that successfully achieve MSS 
standards. Instead they are allocated to those local governments that need more funding to achieve 
MSS standards. These funds are intended for those local governments that truly need additional 
funds instead of to those who have already successfully achieved MSS targets and thus improved 
the quality of the services they provide. In other words, there is no incentive for champions. As 
noted by a government officer in Southwest Sumba: 
 
We will not gain any incentives if we are able to achieve the MSS standards. We only get 
funding to ensure that we can achieve the target with our current capacity. (Local Education 
Agency, District of Southwest Sumba, 2016) 
 
This was confirmed by an officer in MoHA:  
 
In future planning, if a local government is not able to achieve MSS standards, later they 
will be supported by general or specific block grants as a form of incentive. They will be 
prioritised for funding through these grants. (Directorate General of Regional Development 
1, MoHA, 2015)  
 
For this reason, it becomes a question of whether these kinds of incentives are actually ‘true 
incentives’, since they are given to those whose really need them instead of those who have high 
performance. Nevertheless, it is not only a question of whether incentives work or not. It could 
be the case that opposite results to those that are expected could arise; performance, in other 
words, could be weakened.  
 
Given that MSS is not supported by optimal incentives or strong punishments and sanctions (what 
we might call ‘strong’ enforcement techniques), it works to an extent through self-compliance or 
self-motivation. However, in the case of MSS, self-motivation and self-compliance do not lead to 
more motivation or more compliance. In other words, the lack of these elements is less supportive 
towards positive behaviour of local governments to improve performance in delivering services. 
 
The information above also implies that decentralised systems can bring with them limitations in 
terms of enforcement and incentives. This implies limitations of centrally led performance 
management systems, where enforcement is constrained because central government must respect 
the autonomy of the local governments.  
 
This intervention acts as a negative signal for the sustainability of the decentralised system. 
Instead of enforcing local governments, which is considered ineffective in decentralised systems, 
building the system according to MSS, which only requires the achievement of minimum points, 
is selected as a feasible strategy to improve service quality. This also confirms the costs and 
limitations of decentralisation, which is known as the coordination trap or obstacles as mentioned 
by Homme (1995), Fuhr (2011) and Vazquez and Vaillancourt (2011), when the central 
government has limitations in directly intervening and imposing a particular policy on local 
governments in a decentralised system.  
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On the other hand, this also implies the limitations of the central government in imposing more 
equal incentives, unlike in a centralised system. The central government faces difficult decisions 
or dillemmas whether to give these incentives to those who really need it for reasons of equality 
or to champions, ignoring equality. This also confirms that decentralisation allows variety in local 
governments’ financial and human resources and capacities, so it is less easy to set policies to 
deal with inequality traps as a cost of decentralisation, as noted by Homme (1995), Fuhr (2011) 
and Vazquez and Vaillancourt (2011).  
 
Reasons for Continuing Implementation of MSS: Gaining Other Benefits  
 
MSS appears to only motivate a handful of local governments, particularly those that lie just 
below the standards. This leads to a further question: why should the government still continue to 
implement MSS if it does not significantly influence the performance of local governments in 
delivering services? From the interviews that were conducted, it is clear that one benefit that MSS 
has persisted to be implemented is that it is the way of central government to build better 
communications and dialogue with local governments in delivering services.  
 
This dialogue between central and local governments is believed to improve central-local 
relations. Sullivan and Gillanders (2005) and Li (2010) indicate that better mutual understanding 
and having the same voice and policy language when talking about and implementing policy are 
indicators that improve central-local communications. However, it seems that MSS only improves 
‘vertical communication’ between non-political actors. It only improves the communication 
between technical ministries and local technical agencies in central-local relations. A local 
government official in Bekasi said:  
 
Usually, only us and local technical agencies such as the health and education agencies deal 
with the achievement of MSS with the MoHA and technical ministries. We and MoHA are 
usually talking about the management aspects, while local technical agencies and technical 
ministries deal with technical aspects and problems. Through MSS, the communication 
between us and technical ministries becomes better. At least we use the same language or 
voice, so we can easily understand it. (Organisation Bureau, Regional Secretary, City of 
Bekasi, 2016)  
 
In contrast, MSS does not seem to improve vertical communication, which includes political 
actors and horizontal communications. For instance, MSS does not improve communication 
between non-political actors at the central level (1st level) and political actors at the local level 
(2nd level). MSS does not improve communication among these actors in this relation because 
different languages are used by political and non-political actors. MSS, which is set by technical 
ministries, requires technical and management languages. Unfortunately, regional heads 
understand political language, so they face difficulties in understanding or are less interested in 
the language of MSS. As stated by the Mayor of Padang Sidempuan:  
 
I personally do not too frequently interact with technical ministries related to the 
implementation of MSS. Perhaps the language is too technical so the coordination and 
communication are more between technical ministries and local technical agencies. For 
instance, related to MSS in education, the communication is more between the Ministry of 
National Education and our staff in the city education agency as representatives of me. 
(Mayor, city of Padang Sidempuan, 2016) 
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From that statement we can argue that it appears that because of the different languages used by 
regional heads as representatives of local government and technical ministries as representatives 
of the central government, MSS does not improve communication in this relationship. While the 
language of MSS can be easily understood by technical ministries, it is not fully understood by 
the mayor or regional heads. Similarly, MSS does not seem to improve vertical communication 
between political actors and officials at different levels of government. The influence of MSS on 
improving communication between stakeholders can be seen in the Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6. Influence of MSS on central-local communication. 
 
Types of Relations 
(between) 
Principal–Agent 
Relations 
Influences 
Technical ministries and regional 
heads  
Vertical (between 1st and 
2nd level) 
Less improved 
communication 
Technical ministries, local 
agencies and local providers  
Vertical (between 1st and 
2nd level) 
Improves communication 
Regional heads and local people 
(voters)  
Horizontal (2nd level) Does not improve 
communication 
Regional heads and local council 
members 
Horizontal (2nd level) Does not improve 
communication 
Regional heads and local agencies 
and providers 
Vertical (2nd level) Less improved 
Communication 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research is expected to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the compatibility of 
decentralisation with effective performance management in influencing the motivation of public 
sector bodies, which has been subject to limited attention among scholars in public performance 
management. The results of this study show that MSS with its characteristic minimum thresholds 
can lead to varying effects on the motivation of local governments to improve their service 
delivery. MSS does not motivate local governments that are already performing well but, more 
importantly, it also does not motivate those that are performing badly. However, a small positive 
effect is found on the motivation of those whose performance lies just below the minimum 
standards.  
 
This study also shows the limitations of decentralisation systems in executing effective 
performance management. In other words, it seems plausible to say that MSS to some extent is 
not compatible with the application of performance management, which requires strong 
enforcement (punishments and sanctions) and effective incentives. The nature of decentralised 
systems, wherein the autonomy of local governments has to be respected, could lead to inequality 
and coordination traps, which could be incompatible with effective performance management.  
 
However, this does not mean that MSS as performance management tool in decentralised systems 
has no impact at all. As it has limited influence, the MSS system does not achieve its formal 
objectives. MSS survives because it brings central government other benefits. MSS provides a 
framework for central-local dialogue about public service delivery. This could be a good starting 
point for the improvement of public services in districts and cities in the future.  
 
This research also has a number of policy implications that can be embraced by the central 
government to improve the effectiveness of MSS and administrative decentralisation in the future. 
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The firstly policy implication is related to the design of standards. On the one hand, future 
standards should be able to influence the behaviour of more local governments to improve their 
performance. The standards should be able to motivate those local governments whose 
performance lies below the standards, particularly those that have low capacity. On the other hand, 
the standards should be still able to maintain the performance of those who lie above the standards.  
 
In terms of which group of local governments (i.e. those performing above or below the standards) 
are the main targets, there are several measures that could be taken, depending on the objectives 
of the central government. First, the design could allow for asymmetry of standards. In other 
words, there could be an application of different standards for each group of local governments. 
This category could be set based on capacity or other agreed criteria. Another option is to lower 
the minimum standards. This option would suit those local governments whose performance falls 
below the standards because of their low capacity. However, it will have little impact on those 
local governments whose current performance lies above the standards. These local governments 
will become demotivated. The last option is the use of progressive standards, whereby future 
standards can be adjusted and kept near current performance levels. Thus, they could motivate all 
categories of local governments, particularly those whose performance lies below the standards.  
 
The last policy implication is related to the need for strong enforcement (i.e. sanctions and 
punishments). We saw above that a lack of strong enforcement is one of the reasons why the 
influence of MSS on the performance of local governments is relatively low. In other words, 
performance management does not function if it is not accompanied by sanctions for non-
compliance. This is more problematic when implemented in a decentralised system, where these 
are difficult to enforce. There are several ways to deal with this situation. One is to set strong 
enforcement through sanctions and punishments, as happens in a centralised system. This option 
is feasible in the Indonesian context, although it is not as easy to bring about as it would be in a 
centralised system. However, we should consider whether introducing enforcement in MSS could 
cause a reversal of the process of decentralisation and even a re-centralisation of powers instead 
of improving central-local relations. 
 
The second alternative is to rank local governments in a league table system and publish such 
tables transparently. In other words, sharing information about MSS to the public or people is 
desirable. Meanwhile, the capacity of each local government, particularly those with low capacity, 
can be improved through the provision of financial grants and qualified human resources within 
local governments. Another option is to maintain the status quo. This would mean that MSS 
without any enforcement or incentives would be maintained. Instead of improving performance, 
MSS is viewed only as a means to build dialogue or communication between the central 
government and local governments in order to maintain stable relations. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
An earlier draft of this article was presented at “The 4th Planocosmo International Conference”, 
Bandung, 2-4 April 2018. 
 
References 
 
Ahmad, J., S. Devarajan, S. Khemani, and S. Shah (2006) Decentralization and Service Delivery. 
In: Ahmad, E., & G. Brosio (Eds.) Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, 240-268. United Kingdom: 
Edward Elgar. 
Is Decentralisation Compatible with the Application 153 
 
 
 
Alm, J., J.M. Vazquez, and D. Weis (2004) Introduction. In: Alm, J., J.M. Vasquez, S.M. 
Indrawati (Eds.) Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of 
Indonesia: the ‘Big Bang’ Program and its Consequences, 1-14. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
Aritenang, A. (2015) The Impact of AFTA Tariff Reduction on District of Economic Growth. 
Jurnal Perencanaan Wilayah dan Kota 26(1), 18-27. 
Aspinall, E., and G. Fealy (2003) Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and the Rise of 
Local. In: Aspinall, E., and G. Fealy (Eds.) Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
Democratisation and Decentralisation, 79-92. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee (2006) The Rise of Local Governments: an Overview. In: 
Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee (Eds.). Decentralization and Local Governance in 
Developing Countries: a Comparative Perspective, 1-52. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Behn, R.D. (2003) Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures. 
Public Administration Review 63(5), 586-606. 
Boasiako, K.B.A., and P. Csanyi (2014) Introduction: Decentralization from Global Perspective. 
In: Boasiako, K.B.A., and P. Csanyi (Eds.) The Theories of Decentralization and Local 
Government: Implementation, Implication and Realities, a Global Perspective, 9-24. The 
United States: Stephen F. Austin State University Press. 
Braun, D., and D.H. Guston (2003) Principal–agent Theory and Research Policy: an Introduction. 
Science and Public Policy 30(5), 302-308. 
Breton, A. (2002) An Introduction to Decentralization Failure. In: Ahmad, E., and Tanzi (Eds.) 
Managing Fiscal Decentralization, 31-45. London: Routledge. 
Coleman, J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Crowther, D., and M. Green, M. (2004) Organisational Theory. London: Chartered Institute 
Personnel and Development. 
De Bruijn, H. (2007) Managing Performance in the Public Sector. 2nd edn. London: Routledge. 
Fengler, W., and B. Hofman (2009) Managing Indonesia’s Rapid Decentralization: Achievements 
and Challenges. In: Ichimura, S., and R. Bahl (Eds.) Decentralization Policies in Asian 
Development, 245-262. Singapore: World Scientific. 
Ferrazzi, G. (2005) Obligatory Functions and Minimum Services Standards for Indonesia 
Regional Government: Searching for a Model. Public Administration and Development 25(2), 
227-238. 
Firman, T. (2003) Potential Impacts of Indonesia’s Fiscal Decentralization Reform on Urban and 
Regional Development: Towards a New Pattern of Spatial Disparity. Space and Polity 7(3), 
247-271. 
Fuhr, H. (2011) The Seven Traps of Decentralization Policy. International Journal of 
Administrative Science and Organization 18(2), 88-93. 
Hofman, B., and Kaiser, K. (2006) Decentralization, Democratic Transition, and Local 
Governance in Indonesia. In: Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee (Eds.) Decentralization and 
Local Governance in Developing Countries: a Comparative Perspective, 81-124. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press Books. 
Homme, R.P. (1995) The Dangers of Decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer 10(2), 
201-210. 
Hood, C. (1991) A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration 69(1), 3-19. 
Huczynski, A., and D. Buchanan (1991) Organizational Behaviour. 2nd edn. Hertfordshire: 
Prentince Hall International. 
Hudawi, A. (2012) The Implementation of Minimum Services Standards in Inpatient Service in 
Local Hospital in Bekasi District, Indonesia (Pelaksanaan Standar Pelayanan Minimal 
Rumah Sakit pada Pelayanan Rawat Inap di Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah Kabupaten Bekasi). 
Depok: Faculty of Public Health University of Indonesia. 
154  Mohammad Roudo, Adrian Campbell and Simon Delay 
 
 
Hughes, O. (2003) Public Management and Administration: an Introduction. 3rd edn. Basingtoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Inside Housing (2016) Out of Commission. Inside Housing, 12 December 2016. Accessed from 
http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/out-of-commission/6517659.article on 2 June 2017. 
Kompas (2015) Service Still Not Based on the Standards (Layanan Belum Sesuai Standard). 
Kompas, 2015. Accessed from http://print.kompas.com/baca/2015/04/07/Layanan-Belum-
Sesuai-Standar on 21 July 2016.  
Kristiansen, S., and Pratikno. (2006) Decentralising Education in Indonesia. International 
Journal of Educational Development 26(5), 513-531. 
Kristiansen, S., and P. Santoso (2006) Surviving Decentralization? Impacts of Regional 
Autonomy on Health Services Provision in Indonesia. Health Policy 77(3), 247-259. 
Laffont, J.J., and J.J. Martimort (2009) The Theory of Incentives: the Principal–agent Model. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lane, J.E. (2005) Public Administration and Public Management: the Principal–agent 
Perspective. Oxon: Routledge. 
Lane, J.E. (2013). The Principal–agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation and Public 
Policy Making. Open Journal of Political Science 3(2), 85-89. 
Lewis, B.D., and D. Pattinasarany (2009) Determining Citizen Satisfaction with Local Public 
Education in Indonesia: the Significance of Actual Service Quality and Governance 
Conditions. Growth and Change 40(1), 85-115. 
Li, L.C. (2010) Central–local Relation in the People’s Republic of China: Trends, Processes and 
Impacts for Policy Implementation. Public Administration and Development 30(3), 177-190. 
Milward, H.B., and K.G. Provan (2000) Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 10(2), 359-379. 
Moorhead, G., and R.W. Griffin (2012) Managing Organizational Behaviour. 10th ed. Australia: 
South Western Cengage Learning. 
Mullins, L.J. (2008) Essential of Organisational Behaviour. 2nd ed. Harlow, England: Prentice 
Hall. 
Mutaqin, T., et al. (2016) The impact of Decentralization on Educational Attainment in Indonesia. 
In: Holzhacker, R.L., R. Wittek, & J. Woltjer (Eds.) Decentralization and Governance in 
Indonesia, 79-104. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. 
Parker, L., and G. Gould (1999) Changing Public Sector Accountability: Critiquing New 
Directions. Accounting Forum 23(2), 108-135. 
Polidano, C., and D. Hulme (1999) Public Management Reform in Developing Countries. Public 
Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory, 1(1), 121-132. 
Pollitt, C. (1993) Managerialism and The Public Services: Cuts or Cultural Change in the 1990s. 
2nd edn. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Pollitt, C., and G. Bouckaert (2011) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis: New 
Public Management, Governance and the neo-Weberian State. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Roudo, M., and T.M. Chalil (2016) De-Polarization in Delivering Public Services? Impacts of the 
Minimum Service Standards (Mss) to the Quality of Health Services in Indonesia. Journal of 
Regional and City Planning 27(1), 1-5.  
Sinclair, A. (1995) The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 20(2), 219-237. 
Smith, B.C. (1985) Decentralization: the Territorial Dimension of the State. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Strategic Asia. (2013) Decentralization Assessment Report. Jakarta: UNDP. 
Is Decentralisation Compatible with the Application 155 
 
 
 
Sullivan, H., and G. Gillanders (2005). Stretched to the Limit? the Impact of Local Public Service 
Agreements on Service Improvement and Central–local Relations. Local Government Studies. 
31(5): 555-574. 
The World Bank (2003) Decentralizing Indonesia. Jakarta: The World Bank. 
UCLG (2009) Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World: First Global Report. 
Barcelona: United Cities and Local Government and the World Bank. 
Van Dooren, W., G. Bouckaert, and J. Halligan (2010) Performance Management in the Public 
Sector. London: Routledge.  
Vazquez, J.M., and F. Vaillancourt (2011) An Overview of the Main Obstacles to 
Decentralization. In: Vazquez, J.M., and F. Vaillancourt (Eds.) Decentralization in 
Developing Countries: Global Perspectives on the Obstacles to Fiscal Devolution, 1-22. The 
United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Waterman, R.W., and K.J. Meier (1998) Principal–agent Models: An Expansion? Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 8(2), 173-202.  
